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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall**
For the first time in the life of this Article, the 2003 survey period
appears to have experienced a marked decrease in the number of
decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit in the area of employment discrimination.' As Title
VII2 approaches its fortieth anniversary, perhaps this is an indication
that there are fewer and fewer unsettled questions of law in this area.
However, this decline in the number of decisions does not mean that the
2003 survey period was insignificant. The Supreme Court, in Raytheon
Co. v. Hernandez,3 continued its string of decisions restricting the
potential scope of the ADA, and in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,4 the
court rendered an important decision on the burden of proof in mixedmotive cases. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit, after taking a year's
vacation with respect to the difficult area of sexual harassment,

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., curn laude, 1975); University of Virginia
(B.A., 1970). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1985); Florida State
University (B.S., 1973). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2003. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ("Title VII") (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA") (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. V 1999));
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12113 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)); and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997)).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3. 124 S. Ct. 513 (2003).
4. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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rendered two very significant decisions clarifiying how employers may
defend such actions.
I.
A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Disparate Treatment. Even though the familiar circumstantial
evidence model of proof adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green5 was developed in 1973, courts still have
difficulties with it. Three cases during the survey period illustrate this
continuing challenge.
In two cases, the Court addressed the aspect of a plaintiff's prima facie
burden requiring a showing that "similarly situated" employees not in
plaintiff's protected group were involved in the same conduct as plaintiff,
but were treated differently or disciplined more favorably. In the first
action, Knight v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc.,6 plaintiff, an AfricanAmerican female, was hired as a clinical nurse in the surgical services
department of the defendant hospital. Defendant generally adhered to
a four-step progressive program. The third step, called "decision-making
leave," required that the employee take a paid leave day, during which
the employee was required to draft and submit an "action plan"
proposing a solution to the employee's deficiencies. If the employee
submitted no "action plan," the employee had to either resign or be
subject to termination. Plaintiff received a decision-making leave
pursuant to this policy following an incident in which plaintiff was "rude
and disrespectful" to fellow employees at the hospital.' After taking her
decision-making leave, plaintiff submitted an action plan that was
"argumentative and proposed no solution."' In response, defendant
terminated plaintiff's employment. Thereafter, plaintiff brought an
action pursuant to Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act,9 alleging
that she was terminated on account of her sex. The district court
granted summary judgment for the hospital.' °
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether plaintiff had met
her prima facie burden of showing that a "similarly situated" employee

5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
6. 330 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2003).
7. Id. at 1314-15.
8. Id.
9. FLA. STAT. ch. 760.10 (2000).
10. 330 F.2d at 1313.
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not in plaintiff's protected group was treated more favorably.1
Plaintiff pointed to evidence concerning a particular Caucasian nurse
who allegedly committed similar acts of misconduct but was not
terminated. However, the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's argument,
finding that plaintiff's "documented performance and tardiness problems
were much worse" than the Caucasian nurse's problems "in both number
and nature." 2 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that plaintiff
had not presented a prima facie case and affirmed.'"
A similar fate awaited plaintiff in Maynard v. Board of Regents.'4
Plaintiff, after graduating from a medical school in Tennessee, joined the
surgical registry program at the University of South Florida, which was
typically a five-year program. At the end of his fourth year, plaintiff
was advised that he would be required to repeat his fourth-year
residency allegedly because of low scores on his ABSITE exam, an
annual in-service examination required of residents throughout the
country. Plaintiff appealed this decision to an internal Professional
Dispute Resolution Committee ("PDRC"). However, before plaintiff's
appeal was heard, a compromise was worked out under which plaintiff
would contract as a fourth-year resident, while performing fifth-year
work, after which his performance would be reviewed after six months.
Thereafter, plaintiff received a letter identifying several problems with
his performance, including: "failure to attend conferences, changing
schedules without permission, untimely evaluations, and low ABSITE
scores." 5 Again, plaintiff was advised that he was not eligible to be
promoted to his fifth year of residency, and again, plaintiff appealed this
decision to the PDRC. This time, however, plaintiff's appeal was denied,
and plaintiff was formally terminated from the residency program. In
plaintiff's subsequent suit pursuant to Title VII, the district court
granted summary judgment for the university.16 On appeal, plaintiff
argued that he had presented a prima facie case by offering evidence of
several alleged comparators who had similar negative evaluations but
were not terminated from the residency program.'7 The court of
appeals concluded that only one of these individuals was arguably
similar to plaintiff, and even with respect to this individual, the alleged
comparator's negative results "over an isolated period of time" were

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17,

Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1319.
342 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1288-90.
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found to be of no comparison to plaintiff's "overall poor record over an
extended period of time."' 8 Agreeing that plaintiff had not presented
a prima facie case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 9
In Hall v. Alabama Association of School Boards,20 the Eleventh
Circuit reaffirmed just how difficult establishing a failure-to-promote
claim under Title VII is within the Eleventh Circuit. The promotion at
issue involved the highly political position of the superintendent of
education for Talladega County, Alabama. The County Board of
Education engaged in a search process to replace the former superintendent, who had served the school system for two decades.2 ' Plaintiff, an
African-American, had served for a number of years as an administrator
and assistant superintendent in the Talladega County school system and
was one of the individuals seeking the new superintendent position.22
Of twenty-five applicants for the position, plaintiff survived the initial
cut and was one of the six finalists. The board interviewed each of the
six finalists and then pared the list down to three individuals, one of
whom was plaintiff. At this point, the chairman of the board engaged
in heavy communication which each board member in an attempt to
In a subsequent
reach a consensus on a new superintendent.2 3
meeting, the school board, by a vote of 4-1, selected one of the other
finalists, William Gardner, a Caucasian who had served as a superintendent in other school systems outside of Alabama. When Gardner's
appointment was announced, there was much racial strife and protest
in the Talladega community, so much that Gardner decided to decline
the appointment. 24 At this point, the school board reconvened, and this
time, by a 3-2 vote, selected the other Caucasian finalist, Peggy Connell,
who had held the position of administrator and principal at another
school system in Alabama. Plaintiff then brought suit against the school
board pursuant to Title VII, alleging that he was denied the superintendent position on account of his race. 25 The district court, in a lengthy
memorandum opinion, granted summary judgment for the school
board.26

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 1290.
Id.
326 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1158-59.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1160-61.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164-65.
Id.at 1158.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit adopted in toto the "well-reasoned
memorandum opinion" of the district court.2 v Citing the Eleventh
Circuit's prior decision in Cofield v. GoldKist, Inc.,28 the court found
that, in a claim based on a failure to promote, it was not enough for a
plaintiff to show a difference in relative qualifications in order to
establish discriminatory intent, "unless those disparities are so apparent
as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face."29 The court
noted that while the chairman of the school board (with his active
telephone campaign to arrive at a "consensus") may have "engaged in
Machiavellian actions," this did not necessarily mean "that he did so for
racial reasons."3" In this case, both the district court and the Eleventh
Circuit agreed that, because all three of the finalists were very qualified
on paper, and because the disparities between plaintiff's qualifications
and those of the other two finalists were not so apparent "as virtually to
jump off the page and slap one in the face," plaintiff fell short of proving
his claim. 3'
2. Mixed-Motive Cases.

The only Supreme Court case under Title
VII during the survey period, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,32 concerned
a so-called "mixed-motive" issue. The issue before the Court was
whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in
order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction to the jury in a Title VII case.
Plaintiff was employed as a warehouse worker and heavy equipment
operator for Caesar's Palace Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas. Defendant
terminated plaintiff's employment after she was involved in a physical
altercation with a fellow male employee. When the male employee
received only a five-day suspension as opposed to termination, plaintiff
filed suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. At trial, the
district court gave a standard mixed-motive instruction over defendant's
objection (because plaintiff had not produced any "direct evidence" of
discrimination). The jury then rendered a verdict for plaintiff, awarding
back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The Ninth
Circuit, en banc, affirmed the district court's judgment. 3
The Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, the impact of the
1991 amendments to Title VII (which, among other things, codified the

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
267 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2001).
326 F.3d at 1167-68 (quoting Cofield, 267 F.3d at 1268).
Id. at 1168.

31.

Id.

32. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
33. Id. at 91-93.
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burden of proof in mixed-motive cases). Closely examining the language
of the amended statute, the Supreme Court found nothing expressly or
implicitly requiring a plaintiff to present direct evidence of discriminaAccordingly, the Court unanimously
tion in a mixed-motive case.
concluded that no direct evidence showing was required in order to
warrant a mixed-motive instruction.3"
3. Sexual Harassment. Two significant decisions were handed
down by the Eleventh Circuit addressing the parties' respective burdens
in the context of sexual harassment cases. The first case, Walton v.
Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc.,38 clarified the employer's burden in
establishing a Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense., 7 Plaintiff worked
as a sales representative for the defendant pharmaceutical company in
Tampa, Florida. Defendant hired George Mykytiuk as its district
manager for the Tampa area. In this position, Mykytiuk was plaintiff's
direct supervisor. A few months after Mykytiuk was hired, plaintiff
hosted a dinner program for a number of nurse practitioners and
Mykytiuk attended. After the program, Mykytiuk told plaintiff that he
was intoxicated, and asked her to follow him home. When they arrived,
Mykytiuk invited plaintiff into his apartment (which was also his office)
and offered her a glass of wine, which she accepted. Mykytiuk then
began to talk about his marital difficulties, and told plaintiff what a
good friend she had been. Mykytiuk then allegedly jumped on top of
plaintiff and began to kiss her and then allegedly raped her. Plaintiff
did not report this incident to either the police or the company.3"
Several incidents occurred over the next couple of months during
which Mykytiuk allegedly attempted to call plaintiff on numerous
occasions, kiss her, or force himself upon her, including at least one
additional incident when plaintiff accepted an invitation to go back to
Mykytiuk's apartment after a meeting. While there, plaintiff again
accepted a glass of wine from him, and again was allegedly raped by him
(after complying with his request that she lie down on the floor so that
he could give her a massage). More than two months later, plaintiff
finally filed a sexual harassment complaint against Mykytiuk with
defendant's human resources department. Defendant immediately began
an investigation, including an interview with Mykytiuk three days later.

34. Id. at 93-95.
35. Id. at 96.
36. 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003).
37. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
38. 347 F.3d at 1275-76.
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Mykytiuk alleged that he and plaintiff had been involved "in an intense
and consensual affair."39 Mykytiuk was suspended at the conclusion
of this interview. Approximately a week later, the company investigators completed their investigation, finding that the affair between
plaintiff and Mykytiuk was consensual.
However, Mykytiuk was
discharged for "exercising poor judgment."4 ° Nonetheless, plaintiff
never returned to work for defendant. After submitting her sexual
harassment complaint, plaintiff began collecting short-term disability
benefits under defendant's disability plan, and thereafter she received
long-term disability benefits pursuant to defendant's long-term plan.
When plaintiff's employment was terminated after the expiration of her
short-term disability benefits, she brought suit under Title VII, alleging
that she had been the victim of sexual harassment. The district court,
concluding that plaintiff had not suffered an adverse employment action,
granted summary judgment for defendant. 4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit initially examined whether plaintiff
had suffered a tangible job detriment." Although the court of appeals
noted that plaintiffs discharge would ordinarily constitute a tangible
employment action, there was absolutely no evidence that plaintiff was
discharged "because of her sex."43 Rather, the evidence was undisputed
that plaintiff had been discharged "because she elected to take disability
rather than return to work."" The court then addressed whether
defendant had established its Faragher/Ellerth defense, assuming
arguendo that plaintiff had suffered actionable sexual harassment.4 5
With respect to the first prong of the defense (whether defendant acted
reasonably to prevent and promptly correct the sexually harassing
behavior), the court of appeals noted that after plaintiff finally reported
the alleged harassing conduct, the company conducted an immediate
investigation, suspended the alleged harasser three days later, and
discharged the alleged harasser at the conclusion of its investigation.46
In response to plaintiff's allegation that certain aspects of the investigation were inadequate, the court concluded that where the actions taken
by the employer are "sufficient to address the harassing behavior,"
complaints about the investigation resulting in the employer's action

39. Id. at 1276-77.
40. Id. at 1278.
41. Id. at 1278-79.
42. Id. at 1280.
43. Id. at 1281 (emphasis in original).

44. Id.
45.

Id. at 1283.

46. Id. at 1288.
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"ring hollow."4 7 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the first
prong of the affirmative defense had been established.48
With respect to the second prong of the affirmative defense (whether
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of defendant's remedial
measures), the Eleventh Circuit noted that "the victim of the alleged
harassment has an obligation to use reasonable care to avoid harm
where possible."4 9 The court continued to observe: "Here [plaintiff]
could have avoided most, if not all, of the actionable harassment by
reporting Mykytiuk's behavior to [defendant] officials. By failing to do
so, [plaintiff] did not give [defendant] an opportunity to address the
situation and prevent further harm from occurring."5" In conclusion,
the court of appeals held that defendant had adequately established the
second prong of its affirmative defense and affirmed the district court's
decision.5 1
The decision in the second case, Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc.,52 clarified
when an employer has constructive notice of sexually harassing conduct.
Plaintiff worked as a concrete truck driver for defendant Blue Circle,
which was in the business of providing ready-mix concrete. Plaintiff
alleged that she was subjected to various sexual incidents and statements involving her co-workers and several Blue Circle customers. The
most serious incident involved another Blue Circle driver, who, after he
and plaintiff dumped loads of concrete, allegedly splashed water on
plaintiff as they washed down their trucks (with plaintiff responding in
kind), tried to pick up plaintiff and throw her in the concrete that had
just been dumped, and asked plaintiff to go out with him "for a couple
of dollars." He also brushed his hand across plaintiff's buttocks as she
was attempting to get into her truck.53 Plaintiff complained about this
incident to her supervisor. After an investigation, defendant determined
that plaintiff and the co-worker were engaging in "horse play" with each
other and instructed both of them not to engage in this type of conduct
in the future. Besides this oral admonishment, no further action was
taken. Plaintiff brought a Title VII action against Blue Circle, alleging
hostile work environment sexual harassment. The district court granted
summary judgment for Blue Circle, finding that the company had a valid
and well-disseminated sexual harassment policy and had taken

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
324 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1255-56.
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and appropriate action with respect to plaintiff's comimmediate
54
plaint.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit discussed its prior decision in Farley
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,55 and whether Blue Circle, in light of
its well-disseminated sexual harassment policy, was precluded from
being charged with constructive notice of several of the incidents of
alleged harassment involving plaintiff.5" Distinguishing Farley, the
court of appeals held that the fact that defendant's sexual harassment
policy was "well-disseminated" was not, "standing alone," sufficient to
"preclude a finding of constructive notice."57 Rather, the harassment
policy must have been "valid and effective." 5 On this latter issue, the
court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect
to the effectiveness of Blue Circle's sexual harassment policy because a
reasonable jury could have concluded that Blue Circle did not adequately
investigate and respond to plaintiff's most serious sexual harassment
allegation (on the grounds that the company's response was little more
than telling the co-worker to refrain from engaging in horse play). 9
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.6 "
4. Constructive Discharge. A common allegation in discrimination
cases is that the plaintiff was "constructively discharged," i.e., that
working conditions were "so intolerable" that a reasonable person in
plaintiff's position "would [be] compelled to resign."61 Whether a
constructive discharge had occurred was the primary issue in Fitz v.
Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.6 2 Plaintiff, who held the position of
finance and insurance manager for the defendant automobile dealership,
brought an action pursuant to Title VII. The district court found that
the complaint was not timely filed, and it granted summary judgment
for defendant."' On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but on
different grounds.6 The court concluded that no reasonable jury could

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1256.
115 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1997).
324 F.3d at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260-61.
Id. at 1263.
Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir. 1997).
348 F.3d 974 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 976.

64. Id.
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have found that plaintiff was constructively discharged.6 5 The court
summarized the evidence of constructive discharge as follows: (1)
Plaintiff was reprimanded for not attending a golf outing, but the
reprimand was withdrawn as a mistake; (2) two cartoons were attached
to plaintiff's office computer (but there was no evidence linking the
cartoons to defendant); (3) plaintiff was offered the opportunity to leave
his present position and become the dealership's sales manager; (4)
plaintiff's co-workers made statements that defendant planned to fire
him at some point in the future6 6 (which the court characterized as
"[miere suspicion of an unsubstantiated plot") 7; and (5) plaintiff
alleged that his pay was unequal 8 (the court responded: "[ulnequal
pay cannot, standing alone, constitute a constructive discharge"). 9 The
court then characterized the totality of plaintiff's evidence of constructive
"[A] withdrawn reprimand; statements of
discharge as follows:
supervisors that [plaintiff] concedes were not supposed to be revealed to
him; cartoons that were admittedly not condoned by [defendant]; a job
offer; and a baseless claim of unequal pay."7 ° The court of appeals held
that this evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a
constructive discharge and affirmed.71
B.

Defenses to Title VII Actions

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity. In Downing v. Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama,7 2 the issue before the court was
whether the defendant Board of Trustees was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity in a same-sex sexual harassment action pursuant
to Title VII. The district court ruled that plaintiff's claim was not barred
by the Eleventh Amendment, and denied the board's motion to dis73

miss.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on its prior decision in
Cross v. State of Alabama,74 in which it found no Eleventh Amendment
immunity in a sexual harassment and hostile work environment claim

65.
66.

Id. at 979.
Id. at 978.

67.

Id.
Id.
69. Id.
68.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.

Id.
321 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1021.
49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995).
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pursuant to Title VII. 7' Discerning "no material difference between the
sexual harassment in Cross and the harassment in the case at hand,7 6
except for the fact that in the instant case "both the perpetrator and the
victim were male,"77 the Eleventh Circuit agreed that there was no
Eleventh Amendment immunity and affirmed.78
In Williams v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville,7 9 the issue was
whether Jacksonville's fire chief, Rayfield Alfred, was entitled to
qualified immunity in the latest of a long-standing dispute concerning
the promotion practices within the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue
Department. The fire chief, who is African-American, decided not to
create four new roving captain positions within the department, which
resulted in four white lieutenants in the department being passed over
for promotion. The four lieutenants then brought a race and gender
claim pursuant to both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the
Consolidated City of Jacksonville and Chief Alfred, in his individual and
official capacities. Chief Alfred moved for dismissal on the ground of
qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion.80 However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed."
While the court of
appeals agreed that the fire chief's actions, if established, would have
constituted a constitutional violation, the court of appeals concluded that
the unlawfulness of the chief's actions were not "clearly established." 2
Although the court observed, in light of prior precedent, that it had been
established that it was unlawful for a public official to make a racebased or gender-based employment decision with respect to an existing
position, in this case, the court noted that the fire chief's decision was
whether to create four new upper level positions-a decision, according
to the court, that involved "the core constructure of the fire department."83 The court considered this distinction determinative and held
that the fire chief was entitled to qualified immunity8 '
2. Judicial Estoppel. Two cases during the survey period applied
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar discrimination claims where the
plaintiff failed to disclose the discrimination lawsuit in their bankruptcy

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

321 F.3d at 1021-24.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
Id. at 1023-24.
341 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1263-66.
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1272-73.
Id. at 1273.
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court filings. In the first case, DeLeon v. Comcar Industries, Inc., 5
plaintiff filed a petition for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 13 of the
bankruptcy code. Several months later, plaintiff filed a discrimination
action pursuant to Title VII, but never amended his bankruptcy file to
list his discrimination action as a potential asset. The district court
granted summary judgment for defendant on the ground of judicial
estoppel.8" On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the issue
87
was controlled by its prior decision in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.
Although Burnes involved a Chapter 7 filing, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the rule of judicial estoppel established in Burnes "applies equally
in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases."8
89
A similar fate befell the plaintiff in Barger v. City of Cartersville.
Plaintiff brought a discrimination action contesting her demotion by the
city from her position of personnel director to an hourly customer service
representative.
Approximately two months later, plaintiff filed a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition but made no mention of her lawsuit in
the bankruptcy filings. The twist in this case was that plaintiff had
mentioned the discrimination suit to her bankruptcy attorney, but the
bankruptcy attorney had failed to list the lawsuit as an asset. Notwithstanding this fact, the district court granted summary judgment for
defendant on the ground of judicial estoppel.9 ° On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that even if plaintiff's failure to disclose the lawsuit
"could be blamed on her attorney, the nondisclosure could not in any
event be considered inadvertent" 91 and the attorney's omission was
found to be "no panacea."92 Holding that the case was controlled by
Burnes and DeLeon, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.93
C. ProceduralMatters
1.
Conciliation. Employers may find the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") more flexible to deal with in
conciliation negotiations following the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. 94 In that case, the EEOC, after a

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

321 F.3d 1289 (lth Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1290.
Id.; 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
321 F.3d at 1291.
348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1297..
340 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003).
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thirty-two month investigation, issued a "letter of determination" finding
"reasonable cause" to believe that the charging party's allegations of
racial harassment and retaliation were true.95 Eight days later, the
EEOC sent a draft conciliation agreement to defendant's general counsel
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, but after the EEOC's lengthy investigation, gave defendant only twelve business days to respond. Shortly
thereafter, defendant retained a Gainesville, Florida law firm, which
promptly sent the EEOC a letter via facsimile, entering its notice of
appearance and requesting a telephone conference to discuss and
understand the "[EEOC's] basis for its determination."96 The EEOC
ignored this letter, and the next day, sent a letter advising that "efforts
to conciliate this charge ... were unsuccessful," and that "further
conciliation efforts would be futile or non-productive."" Only two days
later, the EEOC filed suit. The district court dismissed the action on the
ground that the EEOC had failed to meet its statutory duty to conciliate
in good faith and awarded attorney fees and costs to defendant."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, citing the Fifth Circuit decision in
EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp.,99 concluded that the following three
elements were required to meet the Title VII test of conciliation: "[Tihe
EEOC must (1) outline to the employer the reasonable cause for its
belief that Title VII has been violated; (2) offer an opportunity for
voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a reasonable and flexible
manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer." 0° The Eleventh
Circuit noted that, after taking almost three years to complete its
investigation, the EEOC, "in a flurry of activity," gave defendant only
twelve business days to respond to its proposed nationwide conciliation
agreement, and then filed suit within a matter of a few days thereafter.1"' Commenting that the "duty to conciliate is at the heart of Title
VII," the court of appeals concluded that this duty "must, at a minimum,
make clear to the employer the basis for the EEOC's charges against
it."' °2 Agreeing that the EEOC had failed to meet its statutory duty
of conciliating in good faith, the Eleventh Circuit concluded with the
following parting shot: "In its haste to file the instant law suit, with
lurid, perhaps newsworthy, allegations, the EEOC failed to fulfill its

95. Id. at 1258.
96. Id.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259.
636 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1981).
340 F.3d at 1259.
Id. at 1259-60.
Id. at 1260.
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statutory duty to act in good faith to achieve conciliation, effect
10 3
voluntary compliance, and to reserve judicial action as a last resort."
2. Class Actions. For a number of years, plaintiffs have encountered difficulties in certifying Title VII class action suits pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' °4 This trend continued in Hines v. Widnall. °5 Plaintiffs were African-American civil
employees at Eglin Air Force base in Pensacola, Florida. They brought
a Title VII complaint seeking to represent a class of all former, current,
and future African-American civil employees and applicants at Eglin,
alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination against AfricanAmericans in hiring, evaluation, and professional practices. The district
court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification.' °6 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit focused on the typicality requirement, i.e., whether
there was a sufficient nexus between the claims of the purported class
representatives and the claims of the class at large.' ° With respect
to the only plaintiffs who were named applicants, the court of appeals
agreed with the district court that both lacked standing to represent the
claims of applicants because neither had exhausted his administrative
remedy prior to filing suit.'0 s As to the three remaining plaintiffs, the
district court concluded that they could not "adequately represent the
spectrum of jobs and divisions at Eglin" because they were seeking to
represent a class that was "far too broad."'
The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that this was not an abuse of discretion and affirmed." 0
D.

Remedies Under Title VII

1.
Arbitration. The enforceability of a Gilmer/Circuit City"'
style arbitration agreement was at issue in Musnick v. King Motor
Co."' Plaintiff had signed an arbitration agreement with his employer, which contained the following provision with respect to the award of
attorney fees and costs:

103. Id. at 1261.
104. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
105. 334 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2003).
106. Id. at 1254-55.

107. Id. at 1256.
108. Id. at 1259.

109. Id. at 1257.
110.
111.
Stores,
112.

Id.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003).
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The prevailing party shall be awarded costs including reasonable
attorneys' fees, filing fee, subpoena service and witness fee, deposition
and hearing transcription costs and similar expenses, but not including
expert fees unless the expert was necessary to establishing or refuting
liability. In cases where a party asserts any claim, position or defense,
which is not substantially justified by the law or facts, the arbitrator
shall award to the opposing party that party's reasonable attorney fees
incurred as a result of that party's defending any such claim, position
or defense."'
Plaintiff filed a religious discrimination action pursuant to Title VII. In
response, defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. However, the
district court denied the motion, finding that the above provision
relating to attorney fees and costs rendered the arbitration agreement
unenforceable." 4
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, relying on its prior
decision in Bess v. Check Express,"5 and the Supreme Court's decision
in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph."' Pursuant to
those decisions, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was plaintiff's
burden to establish that the "loser pays" provision in the arbitration
agreement would likely result in such high costs that he was "effectively
precluded from vindicating his Title VII rights in the arbitral forum. " 117 Agreeing that plaintiff had not met this burden, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed and directed that the case be remanded to arbitration." 8
2. Consent Decrees. In what must have set some type of record,
the long-standing class action dispute in Reynolds v. McInnes,"9 made
its sixth visit to the court of appeals during the survey period. 120 This
long-standing class action litigation, which has spanned eighteen years,
has involved the defendant Alabama Department of Transportation
("ALDOT") and the State Personnel Department ("SPD"), two plaintiff
classes of black employees and prospective employees of ALDOT, and an

113. Id. at 1257.
114. Id.
115. 294 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002).
116. 531 U.S. 79 (2000); 325 F.3d at 1258-62.
117. 325 F.3d at 1260.
118. Id. at 1262. Relying on Musnick, the Eleventh Circuit also reached an identical
result in Summers v. Dillards,Inc., 351 F.3d 1100 (11th Cir. 2003).
119. 338 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2003).
120. See Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,52 MERCER
L. REV. 1367, 1386-89 (2001) and 53 MERCER L. REV. 1367, 1382-83 (2002).
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intervening class of non-black employees.12'
This latest appeal
concerned an injunctive order from the district court requiring ALDOT
to implement certain multi-grade job classifications in order to comply
with a prior consent decree entered in the case. 22 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the consent decree required that the jobs in
question be "collapsed or restructured" if a job classification study
mandated under the decree disclosed that the "existing distinctions in
the levels of multi-grade jobs do not reflect actual differences in duties,
responsibilities, or qualifications." 12 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the job classifications proposed by defendants
124
did not reflect the actual distinctions shown by the job study.
12
Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated the district court's order. 1
However, in doing so, the court of appeals offered some concluding
12
thoughts in what is probably the most significant aspect of this case. 1
Comparing the action to "an elephant in the parlor," the court of appeals
commented that the "problems of the Reynolds litigation have become too
big to ignore. "121
Making note of the millions of dollars paid in
attorney fees in the case to date, the court of appeals offered the
following closing advice:
With their fees for a particular effort not dependant upon its success,
the plaintiffs' attorneys may have insufficient reason not to multiply
proceedings and to contest every aspect of every part of every conceivable proceeding regardless of merit. The promise of fees for time spent
without regard to the outcome of a motion or appeal in a case that
apparently has endless potential for dispute may be the kerosene that
has fueled the litigation fires which have raged out of control in this
case. The district court may wish to consider whether cutting down 1on2
that fuel is an appropriate way to help bring the fire under control. 1
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Several ADEA cases decided during the survey period are worthy of
note as they focused on the differences and similarities between ADEA

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

338 F.3d at 1201-02.
Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
Id.
Id. at 1220 (citation omitted).
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and Title VII causes of action. The decisions concern available defenses
and legal theories under the two employment laws.
A.

Notice of Claim
In Jones v. Dillard's,Inc.,129 the court attempted to clarify when the
statute of limitations for the purpose of filing charges begins to run in
an ADEA claim. The district court had granted Dillard's motion for
summary judgment, accepting its argument that Byrd's claim was timebarred because she had failed to file her EEOC charge within 180 days
of any alleged act of discrimination. 3 ° The district court found that
Byrd had reason to believe she had suffered age discrimination more
than 180 days before she filed her EEOC charge.'
Specifically, the
trial court found that Byrd had suspected she was a victim of age
discrimination long before November 1, 1999, the date that she learned
that a twenty-eight-year-old woman had been hired to fill her former
position. Byrd had been told in April or May of 1999 that her position
was being eliminated. On June 12, 1999, she prepared notes about her
discovery that two individuals were to be hired to perform similar
work. "32
'
Dillard's argued successfully in the district court that the
June 12, 1999, information started the 180-day clock ticking. 3 The
Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded on appeal, however.'
The court of appeals began its analysis with the following observations:
Reviewing the case law in this area, we observe that some employers
will seek to avoid liability by observing the letter of the law, while
truly ignoring its spirit. The malicious employer can attempt to
circumvent ADEA liability by timing its discriminatory acts. Firing an

129. 331 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 1263. The period during which a person must file a complaint with the
EEOC depends on whether or not a state is a "deferral state" under the ADEA. Deferral
states are those that have a state agency equivalent to the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d),
633 (2000); see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 1998);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 1991). In deferral states,
an aggrieved individual must file an age discrimination claim with the EEOC within 300
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). In states without
a fair employment practices agency, the ADEA requires a charge be filed within 180 days
after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (2000). Alabama has
a state discrimination statute, the Alabama Age Discrimination and Employment Act, but
it does not have an EEOC equivalent. 331 F.3d at 1263.
131. 331 F.3d at 1262.
132. Id. at 1262-63.
133. Id. at 1262.
134. Id. at 1264.
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employee for "financial" reasons, concealing the true motivation (i.e.,
age), and then replacing that employee with someone outside of the
protected class six months later is all that may be necessary to
discriminate illegally yet escape liability. If the employee acts on a
mere suspicion, he has acted prematurely: the employee's claim will
likely fail because the truly damning evidence has not yet
emerged-and will not emerge given the defendant's revelation of the
suit. If, on the other hand, the employee lies in wait for the surfacing
of tell tale evidence, i.e., the hiring of a younger employee, the cunning
employer will escape liability by postponing the hiring of a replacement
for at least six months. Thus, an employee thrust into this situation
faces two equally unattractive options, neither furthering the ADEA's
purpose. 135

Relying on the analysis of the Supreme Court's holding in Chardon v.
Fernandez,36 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the proper focus
with respect to when a statute of limitations begins to run is the time of
the discriminatory act, not when mere suspicions of discrimination
arise. 3 7 The district court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of
Dillard's was reversed and vacated. 38 Because there were remaining
certified questions to be addressed by the Alabama Supreme Court
concerning other state-law-based aspects of the appeal, the39court delayed
remand until the lower court addressed those questions.
A similar question was before the court in Wright v. AmSouth
Bancorporation.4 ° In a corollary analysis, the court determined that
the announcement of a final decision to terminate an employee, as
opposed to the actual termination, triggers the filing period clock.'
On September 15, 1999, AmSouth issued a memorandum announcing
the return of a former employee to assume a position very similar to that
then occupied by Wright. Upon hearing the announcement, Wright
suspected that he was the target of age discrimination and that his
termination from employment was inevitable. On December 1, 1999,
Wright was directed to meet with AmSouth human resources personnel
to set an end date for his employment.'
The district court granted

135.
136.
137.

Id. (citations omitted).
454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981).
331 F.3d at 1266.

138. Id. at 1268.
139. Id. at 1270-71. The court delayed remand until the Alabama Supreme Court could
define the limitation period applicable to Byrd's claim under the Alabama Age Discrimination and Employment Act. Id. at 1270.
140. 320 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2003).
141. Id. at 1201.
142. Id. at 1200.
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summary judgment for AmSouth, concluding that Wright should have
known that he was about to be fired on September 15, 1999, when the
announcement was made that the former employee was returning.'
Applying the reasoning similar to that used by the panel in Jones,1 "
this panel of the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court and
instead concluded that while Wright might have subjectively concluded
that his termination was inevitable when the announcement was made,
that subjective belief, standing alone, provided no evidence of either a
firm decision by AmSouth to fire him, or of the communication of such
a decision from AmSouth.'
The court of appeals observed:
Wright's statement was nothing more than his subjective deduction
based on the circumstantial evidence before him. AmSouth's reliance
on Wright's speculation demonstrates the principal weakness of their
argument: the absence of and unequivocal communication of the
termination decision from AmSouth to Wright. The reemployment of
Burks in September 1999 also offers no proof of and unequivocal
communication of termination to Wright. When an employee is left
simply to infer and deduce his employment status from the surrounding events, no unequivocal communication of an adverse employment
decision has occurred. In the context of a Title VII discrimination case,
we have said a plaintiff who "may have had reason ... to suspect that
she might be terminated [based on the circumstances known to her]...
was not enough to start the charge filing running." We have also said
a plaintiff must be "told that she is actually being terminated" before
the 180-day filing period begins to run,
14 6 "not that she might be
terminated if future contingencies occur."
Because the termination decision was first unequivocally communicated to Wright on December 1, 1999, the panel determined that the
existence of this dispute precluded the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the ADEA claim and reversed."'
B.

Making Application

The court's decision in Smith v. J. Smith Lanier & Co.,' 4 clarifies
somewhat an employer's obligation to consider employees subjected to a
reduction in force for other positions of employment. Smith's employer

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1201.
331 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).
320 F.3d at 1203.
Id. (quoting Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir.

2000)).
147. Id.
148. 352 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2003).
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informed her that Smith's position was being eliminated to reduce the
workforce. At that time, Smith orally stated that she would take any
position available within the company and that she was even willing to
relocate in order to remain employed with defendant. Following her
termination meeting, but before her last day of work, Smith learned of
several vacant positions listed on the company's website. She did not,
however, express specific interest in any of them and never submitted
any employment application for any available position at any other time.
The district court granted summary judgment to her former employer
with respect to the ADEA failure to rehire or transfer claims. The
district court found that Smith failed to produce any evidence that she
ever applied for a job or put her former employer on notice that she was
interested in any specific position of employment that might have been
available. " 9
"
Aligning with both the Sixth 5 ° and Seventh Circuits15
' on this
question, the Eleventh Circuit held that a general interest in being
rehired is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a prima facie age
discrimination claim when an employer has publicized the availability
of such positions to its general workforce.' 52 An employee interested
in alternate employment in the face of a reduction in force must make
some effort to obtain the employment.'53
C.

Same Decision Defense

In Steger v. General Electric Co., 154 the panel determined that the
"same-decision" defense is available in ADEA claims. 55 Under the
same-decision defense, even if an employee has shown that the
employment decision was based on an illegal motive, the employer may
nevertheless avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same employment decision would have been made in
the absence of any unlawful discrimination.' 56 The panel explained

149. Id. at 1344.
150. Wanger v. G. A. Gray Co., 872 F.2d 142, 145-46 (6th Cir. 1989).
151. Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir. 1985).
152. 352 F.3d at 1345.
153. See id. at 1345-46.
154. 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003).
155. Id. at 1075.
156. Id. at 1066. The same-decision defense was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1989), a Title VII
case. See also Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). In
order to effectively assert the defense, the employer's evidence "must show that its
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision." 318
F.3d at 1075 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252). Under the defense, "proving that
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that the evidence of the legitimate reason must also stand on its
own. 157
III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Clearly the most significant ADA decision reported during the survey
period came from the Supreme Court. The decision continues the
Court's trend of contracting the scope of the ADA.
In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,' the Supreme Court concluded that
a company policy against rehiring former employees discharged for
misconduct constituted a legitimate, nondisability-related reason for a
refusal to rehire.159 The Court determined that while both disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims are cognizable under the ADA,
the Ninth Circuit had improperly applied a disparate impact analysis to
a disparate treatment claim.1 60 Particular significance is that the
decision of the Court was a unanimous one. However, Justices Souter
and Breyer took no part in the decision of the case.' 6 '
As a result of testing positive for cocaine while initially employed by
Raytheon, Hernandez was forced to resign his employment. Two years
later, he applied for rehire, indicating that he had successfully completed
drug rehabilitation. Raytheon refused to rehire Hernandez because (1)
the earlier positive drug test result constituted misconduct under the
company's employment policies, and (2) it had an unwritten policy
against rehiring any employee terminated from employment for
misconduct. '62
Concluding that the Ninth Circuit had improperly focused on whether
the policy in question screened out persons with a record of addiction,
the Supreme Court observed that those factors pertain to disparate
impact claims but not to disparate treatment claims.6 3
Because
Hernandez had waived a disparate impact theory by not timely raising
it below, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings."

the same decision would have been justified absent a retaliatory motive is not the same as
proving the decision would have been made absent the motive." Id. at 1075-76 (quoting
Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 402 (11th Cir. 2001)).
157. 318 F.3d at 1076.
158. 124 S. Ct. 513 (2003).
159. Id. at 516.
160. Id. at 519.
161. Id. at 515.
162. Id. at 516.
163. Id. at 518-19.
164. Id. at 519-21.
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Qualified Individuals and Reasonable Accommodations
In Wood v. Green,'65 the Eleventh Circuit determined that an

employee's request for an indefinite leave of absence was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA and, thus, the employee was not a
"qualified individual with a disability" for ADA purposes. 6' Wood
suffered from cluster headaches for a number of years, which his public
sector employer valiantly attempted to accommodate during that time
in various ways, including granting Wood numerous discretionary
leaves.'6 7 The court concluded that in effect Wood was not seeking an
accommodation to allow him to work through his indefinite leave
request, but rather, extraordinary future dispensation. 6 ' The court of
appeals explained:
While a leave of absence might be a reasonable accommodation in some
cases, Wood was requesting an indefinite leave of absence. Wood might
return to work within a month or two or he could be stricken with
another cluster headache soon after his return and require another
indefinite leave of absence. Wood was not requesting an accommodain the present, but rather, in
tion that allowed him to continue work
169
the future-at some indefinite time.
Because Wood was requesting an indefinite leave of absence so that he
might be able to return to work at some uncertain point in the future,
accommodation simply was not reasonable under the
his requested
170
ADA.

B.

Coverage

In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, PC. v. Wells, 17 the
Supreme Court extended the general test for determining when a
shareholder-director is an employee for purposes of other federal anti-

165. 323 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 1311-14. In order to establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, a
plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he was a "qualified individual with a disability." See
Lucas v. W. W. Granger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the ADA, a
"qualified individual" is a person who is capable of performing the essential functions of
his or her job with or without reasonable accommodation. 323 F.3d at 1312.
167. 323 F.3d at 1311.
168. Id. at 1314.
169. Id.

170.
171.

Id.
538 U.S. 440 (2003).
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discrimination statutes in the ADA context. 17 2 Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates ("Clackamas") employed Wells for several years as
a bookkeeper. Following the termination of her employment, Wells
brought an action alleging disability discrimination. Clackamas denied
that it was an employer covered by the ADA because it did not have
fifteen or more employees in the requisite twenty weeks as required by
the coverage definition of the ADA. Disposition of this question was
dependent upon whether four physician shareholders who owned the
professional corporation and constituted its board of directors were to be
counted as employees for coverage purposes.1 7 ' Relying on an "economic realities" test first adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 17 4 the district court had concluded that the four doctors in
question were "more analogous to partners in a partnership than to
7
shareholders in a general corporation""
' and therefore were "not
employees for purposes of the federal anti-discrimination laws."1 7 6 A
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting
the economic realities approach and holding instead that "the use of any
corporation, including a professional corporation 'precludes any
examination to determine whether the entity is in fact a partnership.'"1 77 The Ninth Circuit panel saw
no reason to permit a professional corporation to secure the "best of
both possible worlds" by allowing it to assert its corporate status in
order to reap the tax and civil liability advantages and to argue that
it was like a partnership 1in
order to avoid liability for unlawful
78
employment discrimination.
The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the
1 79
circuits.

172. Id. at 450-51. Under the ADA, there is a fifteen employee threshold for coverage.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000). Under the ADEA, there is a twenty employee threshold for
coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000). Title VII has a fifteen employee threshold for
coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). Consequently, the Court's analysis is significant
to the question of whether federal anti-discrimination legislation is applicable to very small
businesses.
173. 538 U.S. at 442.
174. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (1984).
175. 538 U.S. at 442.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 442-43 (quoting Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., P.C., 794 F.2d 793,
798 (2d Cir. 1986)).
178. Id. at 443 (quoting Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 1271 F.3d
903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001)).
179. Id. at 444.
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Accepting the reasoning of the EEOC as dispositive on the issue,18
the Court announced that the following six factors are relevant to the
correct determination of whether a shareholder-director is an employee
for coverage purposes: (1) "Whether the organization can hire or fire the
individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual's work;"181
(2) "Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the
8 2
(3) "Whether the individual reports to someone
individual's work;""
higher in the organization;" 183 (4) "Whether and, if so, to what extent
the individual is able to influence the organization;"1" (5) "Whether
the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in
written agreements or contracts;"'85 and (6) "Whether the individual
shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization."8 6
The Court went on to state:
As the EEOC's standard reflects, an employer is the person, or group
of persons, who owns and manages the enterprise. The employer can
hire and fire employees, can assign tasks to employees and supervise
their performance, and can decide how the profits and losses of the
business are to be distributed. The mere fact that a person has a
particular title-such as partner, director, or vice president-should
not necessarily be used to determine whether he or she is an employee
or a proprietor. Nor should the mere existence of a document styled
"employment agreement" lead inexorably to the conclusion that either
party is an employee. Rather, as was true in applying common law
rules to the independent-contractor-versus-employee issue ... the
answer to whether a shareholder-director is an employee depends on
"all of the incidents of the relationship ... with no one factor being
decisive."" 7
IV.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866

Only a few noteworthy 1866 Civil Rights Act'
reported during the survey period.

decisions were

180. The EEOC filed a brief for the United States et al. as amici curiae, advocating that
the Court should examine "whether shareholder-directors operate independently and
manage the business or instead are subject to the firm's control." Id. at 449-50 (quoting
Brief of Amici Curiae EEOC at 8, Clackamus, 538 U.S. 440 (No. 01-1435)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 450.

183. Id.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 605:0009).
Id. at 450-51 (citations omitted).
14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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Same Decision Defense
In Bogle v. McClure,8's the court affirmed punitive damages awards
of two million dollars each for caucasian librarians employed by the City
of Atlanta who were discriminated against on the basis of their race.'
For purposes of this Article, however, the decision is most significant for
holding that the same decision defense is available in Section 1983

A.

actions. 191

Same Sex Sexual Harassment Not Clearly Established
The Eleventh Circuit, in Snider v. Jefferson State Community
College,'9 2 determined that Alabama public officials were entitled to
qualified immunity in a same sex sexual harassment claim because the
right to be free from such workplace harassment was not clearly
established for section 1983 purposes at the time of plaintiff's cause of
B.

action. "9

C. Deciding Who is a Decision-Maker
In a ruling that should be helpful for future municipal liability
determinations in the State of Florida, the court concluded that a county
administrator is not a final policy-maker with respect to the termination
of the county library director. 94 This was so because the library
director was entitled to administrative review under Florida law.'95

189. 332 F.3d 1347 (llth Cir. 2003).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1356.
192. 344 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2003).
193. Id. at 1328. While acknowledging that courts had previously held that same sex
sexual harassment claims were actionable under Title VII against a private employer, the
panel concluded that that precedent did not fairly put public sector employers on notice
that their alleged conduct violated a clearly established federal constitutional right. Id.
While further acknowledging that the elements of Title VII and constitutional actions are
the same, "It]his observation, by itself however, would not compel every objectively
reasonable government official to believe that, if its conduct violated Title VII, it would also
necessarily violate the Constitution." Id. at 1328 n.4.
194. Id. at 1326.
195. Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003).
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Attorney Fees Under Section 1988

In Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of America,'96 the court concluded
that the time expended by an attorney on litigating a fees issue is
properly awardable under section 1988.197
V.

CONCLUSION

While several interesting employment law cases were decided during
the survey period, the overall number of noteworthy cases reaching the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals continues to decline. Although
employment law still represents a substantial portion of the Eleventh
Circuit's docket, the past fear that such cases would eventually
overwhelm the court's docket appears unwarranted.

196.
197.

334 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).

